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TITLE VIII LITIGATION: DEMISE OF THE PRIMA
FACIE CASE DOCTRINE IN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT-METROPOLITAN HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. VILLAGE
OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS
With the enactment of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968',
Congress indicated its intention2 to eradicate racial3 discrimination in
the housing market. Although lower federal courts have construed
Title VIII liberally,4 the Supreme Court has yet to authoritatively
mandate a uniform standard for assessing a plaintiffs claim. The
Seventh Circuit, in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights' (Arlington Heights 11), articulated a new
test6 for determining what circumstances constitute a Title VIII viola-
1. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970). The Act's scope is not lim-
ited to private discrimination. It also prohibits federal, state and local governmental
discrimination. Id See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1977).
2. "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limita-
tion, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). Be-
cause Title VIII was passed on the floor as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the only available legislative history is in the congressional debates. For a gen-
eral discussion, see Dubofsky, Fair Housing. A Legislative History and Perspective, 8
WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970), as amended by Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729. The Act's proscription is not limited
to racial discrimination. Also made unlawful is discrimination on the basis of color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
4. "Courts have consistently interpreted civil rights laws as remedial legislation to
be liberally construed so that their beneficial objectives may be realized to the fullest
extent possible." Comment, Appling the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VII
Litigation, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128, 158-59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Harvard Comment]. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (applying
Civil Rights Act of 1866); United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576, 579
(D.C. Fla. 1976) (Title VIII); United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp.
544, 548 (D.C. Va. 1975) (Title VIII); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1046 (E. D.
Mich. 1975) (Title VIII).
5. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
6. Id. at 1290-93.
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7. Fair housing plaintiffs have two other possible remedies, §§ 1982-1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
42 U.S.C. § 1982-1983 (1970); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1983, which
gives a cause of action to any individual who has been deprived of "any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution," has been used to remedy both pri-
vate and governmental discrimination in housing. See Clark v. Universal Builders,
Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974) (exploitation of
existing residential segregation held to be prima facie violative of § 1983); Dailey v.
City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (city government's failure to rezone to
allow a low-cost housing development to be built held to be racially motivated and
violative of § 1983).
Section 1982, which gives to all persons the same rights to "inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property" as white citizens, was revitalized in
Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,417-37 (1968). The Court held that § 1982 prohib-
its private, as well as public, racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property.
See also Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(refusal of real estate broker to direct black buyers to houses in substantially white
neighborhoods held violative of§ 1982); Smith v. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th
Cir. 1971) (landlord's refusal to rent apartment to prospective tenant, based partially
on racial considerations, held violative of § 1982).
The Equal Protection Clause is available to plaintiffs as a means of attacking gov-
ernmental discrimination in the housing market. Statutes that have racial classifica-
tions on their face, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (city ordinance requiring
referendum approval of any city council action that involves racial discrimination in
housing), or that encourage private discrimination, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (state constitution gives private individuals absolute discretion to discriminate
in the sale or rental of property); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961) (state is so closely related to the operation of a restaurant located in a public
parking garage that the restaurant's racial discrimination is considered to be state
action), violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Other cases show that a racially discriminatory effect establishes a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (city's refusal to tie in low-cost housing
development to water and sewer system has a racially discriminatory effect); Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (denial of municipal
services has racial effect); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aP4 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (city's failure to issue building permit for apart-
ments on properly zoned land); Kennedy Park Home Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum) (city moratorium on new subdivisions); Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (unintentional effect
of urbanrenewal put urban displacees in a housing market that discriminated against
non-whites). These cases have been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's
holding in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299, 245 n.12 (1976), that a discriminatory
intent must be shown to prove a constitutional violation. See note 25 supra
The Supreme Court also rejected any equivalence between income classifications
and racial classifications for equal protection purposes. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137, 141 (1971). Vali'erra involved an equal protection challenge to a California
statute requiring local and county referendum approval of any low-cost housing pro-
ject built or owned by the state. Id. at 139. The Court refused to invalidate the




Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), a non-
profit, low-cost housing developer, purchased a tract of land in the
Village of Arlington Heights for the purpose of developing federally
subsidized low- and moderate-income housing.' Upon the Village
Board of Trustees denial of MHDC's petition for rezoning,9 MHDC
and three minority individuals filed suit in federal court alleging that
the village's refusal to rezone "perpetuated segregation and denied
MHDC the right to use its property in a reasonable manner in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause" and the Fair Housing Act (Title
VIII).' ° The United States Supreme Court affirmed" the district
court's holding that, absent racial motivation, governmental action
having only a racially disproportionate impact does not establish a
constitutional violation.' 2 The Court, however, remanded the case for
a determination of whether the Village's conduct violated the Fair
Housing Act. On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that under
"some circumstances a violation of § 3604(a) [of Title VIII] can be
established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing
of discriminatory intent."'"
Congress enacted Title VIII for the express purpose of guarantee-
avoided racial classification. Id. at 141. Justice Douglas, in dissent, viewed the law
as an invalid wealth classification. Id. at 143. See generally Chandler, Fair Housing
Laws: .4 Critique, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 159 (1953); Harvard Comment, supra note 4, at
133-50.
8. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp.
208, 209 (N.D. IM. 1974), rev'a 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'dandremandeg 429
U.S. 252 (1977).
9. Id. at 210. Plaintiff's land was zoned solely for single-family residences.
Plaintiff sought a rezoning to allow construction of multiple-family dwellings.
10. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
411 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and remande4 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
11. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
12. Id. at 264-65. The Court held that, in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), plaintiffs equal protection challenge must fail absent a showing of dis-
criminatory intent. Seenote 25 infra.
The Court did not reverse the Seventh Circuit's finding that the village's actions
practiced a racially discriminatory "ultimate effect." See note 18 infra Rather, the
Court deemed a "discriminatory 'ultimate effect' to be without independent constitu-
tional significance." 429 U.S. at 271. See generallyMandelker, Racial Discrimination
and Exclusionary Zoning- .4 Perspective on Arlington Heghtg 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217
(1977); Wolff& Keyko, Propertg 1976 AiNN. SURVEY AM. L. 711,746-49; 7 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 141 (1976); 55 N. CAR. L. REv. 733 (1977); 14 URBAN L. ANN. 307 (1978).
13. 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act
states that it shall be unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
1978]
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ing equal access to housing.14 Courts have utilized Title VIIII' to
eliminate barriers against fair housing. 6 Some courts have held
that, in order to establish a prima facie violation 7 under Title VIII, a
plaintiff need only show that a defendant's action, or inaction, has a
racially discriminatory effect.'" Under this approach, proof of de-
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). See generally Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zon-
ing: Contrasting Recent Federal and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
(1975).
15. See note 4 supra.
16. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975), citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431
(1971). Although Griggs was an equal employment opportunity (Title VII) case, Ti-
tle VII and Title VIII have been interpreted by some courts as embodying the same
broad purposes. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra.
The Supreme Court has allowed a wide range of plaintiffs to file suit under the Fair
Housing Act. For example, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972), the Court construed "person aggrieved," 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), to include
a white apartment dweller who alleged that his right to live in an integrated commu-
nity had been violated by defendant's racially discriminatory rental policies. Id. at
208-12. See also Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (construing
§ 3604(c) broadly so as to prohibit the City Recorder from "publishing" any deeds
containing racially restrictive covenants). See generaly Carey, Matish & Richman,
An Analysis of Recent Housing Discrimination Cases, 52 J. URB. L. 897 (1975).
17. "The proper meaning of 'prima-facie case' is that quantum of evidence tend-
ing to prove each material fact that a plaintiff must introduce to sustain his burden of
going forward with the evidence, le., render himself immune from a nonsuit." Rehm
v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
18. "Discriminatory effect" is subject to many definitions. One definition
equates discriminatory effect with "disparate impact," ie., the challenged action has
an effect that burdens blacks (or other minorities) more than whites. Disparate im-
pact can be measured absolutely, as in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp.
987 (D.C. Pa. 1976), where the court looked to the fact that more blacks than whites
were affected, or proportionately, as in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lack-
awanna, 436 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), where a
city's subdivision moratorium prevented low-cost housing construction, thus perpetu-
ating the segregation of 98.9% of the city's blacks in one area.
Discriminatory effect may also be grounded in the "historical context" and "ulti-
mate effect" of the challenged action. "Historical context" refers to the past history
of residential segregation in a metropolitan area. "Ultimate effect" looks beyond the
immediate effect of a challenged action to its impact upon the whole metropolitan
area. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). In Black Jack, the court found that the city's
zoning ordinance, prohibiting new multiple-family dwellings, had the ultimate effect
of excluding 85% of all metropolitan blacks from living in suburban Black Jack. Id.
The court also found that the ordinance had a metropolitan impact of restricting
blacks to inner city housing. Id. For further discussion, see text accompanying




fendant's racial motivation is not essential to establish a Title VIII
violation. 19
This discriminatory effect2" test for Title VIII is not spelled out in
the statute itself. Rather, those lower courts that have adopted the
"effect" test in fair housing litigation have analogized Title VIII cases
to equal employment opportunity (Title VII)21 cases. In Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,22 the Supreme Court, for the first time, addressed
the issue of what burden of proof an employee must meet to establish
a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII.
The Court held that Congress, in enacting Title VII, "directed the
828-29, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1966), a fd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Court considered
past efforts of state legislature to prohibit discrimination); Bogen & Falcon, The Use
of Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. REV. 59 (1974); Harvard Comment,
supra note 4, at 165.
Prior to Arlington Heights 11, only two circuit courts expressed opinions as to the
proper Title VIII standard of review. The Eighth Circuit considered the question in
a number of cases. See Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp. 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). These cases agree that a racially discrimina-
tory effect creates a prima facie Title VIII violation. However, the cases differ as to a
defendant's burden once a prima facie case has been established. See note 33 infra.
In contrast, the Second Circuit rejected the effect test for Title VIII cases. In Boyd
v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975), plaintiff challenged a landlord's use of income criteria in selecting tenants.
Id. at 1112. Although the income requirements had the effect of excluding more
blacks than whites, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that income-based crite-
ria is equivalent to racial criteria so as to invoke Title VIII. Id, citing James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
Judge Mansfield's dissent in Boyd presents an eloquent argument in favor of the
"effect test." Id. at 1115-18. The dissent argued that Valtierra, dealing with an Equal
Protection violation, is inapposite to the Boyd Title VIII violation. Id. at 1116.
Judge Mansfield urged the use of objective standards over subjective evaluations of
racial motivation in Title VIII cases. Id.
The Third Circuit, six weeks after Arlington Heights II, also adopted the effect test.
In Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'g 425 F. Supp.
987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the court held that Philadelphia's cancellation of a low-income
housing development had a racially discriminatory effect sufficient to establish a Title
VIII violation. Id. at 149-50.
19. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. L & H Land Dev.
Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576, 579 (D.C. Fla. 1976).
20. See note 18 supra.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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thrust of the Act to the consequences of the employment practices. '23
Therefore, a showing of racially discriminatory effec124 will establish
a prima facie Title VII violation .2 Additionally, the Court held that
once a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to
the employer to show that the challenged requirement has a manifest
relationship to the employment in question. 26
Two circuits have applied this prima facie case doctrine to Title
VIII cases.2 7 These courts based the extension of the prima facie case
23. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). The challenged practices consisted of the
employer's criteria for hiring new employees and promotion of incumbent employees.
A high school diploma and satisfactory performance on two aptitude tests, which
were not job related, were the source of controversy. Because black workers gener-
ally had lower educational backgrounds, the challenged practices effectively "froze"
the results of past discrimination. Id. at 430. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 59, 63 (1972).
24. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See Note,
Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law. Statistical Proof and
Rebuttal, 59 HARV. L. REv. 387 (1975).
25. Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause require different standards of
proof. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), delineates the different standards.
In order to prove a constitutional violation, an employee must show intentional dis-
crimination by the employer. A showing only of disparate impact will not establish a
constitutional violation. Id. at 238-42. See also Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dcv. Corp. [Arlington Heights I], 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Court
applies the discriminatory equal protection intent requirement to zoning challenge);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) (Effect test applied to
Title VII suit challenging police department hiring policies).
The Court emphasized the difference between Title VII and constitutional cases
when it noted that "[h]owever this [Title VII] process proceeds, it involves a more
probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where spe-
cial racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed." Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976).
A number of recent cases recognize that only discriminatory effect need be shown
to establish a prima facie Title VII violation. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 328 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); United
States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977).
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971). To rebut an employee's
prima facie case of employment discrimination, the employer must show that the
challenged requirement is a "business necessity." In Griggs, this meant the employer
had to prove the challenged requirements (adequate performance on two non-job re-
lated aptitude tests and a high school diploma) were related to the jobs in question.
Id. at 436. See M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (em-
ployer must "articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" to rebut a plain-
tif's prima facie case of employment discrimination).




doctrine to the Fair Housing Act on the ground that, since both deal
"with similar purposes and policies in the area of civil rights,"28 Title
VIII should be accorded the same broad construction as Title VII.2 9
The Eighth Circuit adopted this Title VII-Title VIII analogy in
United States v. City of Black Jack.3" The Black Jack court held that
the city's action,3 when considered in light of its historical context
and ultimate impact,32 had a racially discriminatory effect on a mi-
nority's housing opportunities. With plaintiffs prima facie case es-
tablished by this showing of discriminatory impact, the burden of
proof shifted to the city to justify its discriminatory action.33
28. Harvard Comment, supra note 4, at 158. See United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1178, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
29. See Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975) (court noted
that Title VII should be "liberally construed" in favor of discrimination victims). See
also 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05 (4th ed. 1974).
30. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). "Just as
Congress requires. . . the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification[,] Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1971), such barriers must also give way in the field of housing." Id. at 1184.
31. In June 1970, the Inter-Religious Center for Urban Affairs (ICUA) an-
nounced the approval of federal funding for an "alternative housing opportunity for
persons of low and moderate income living in the ghetto areas of St. Louis." Id. at
1182. The "housing alternative," a development of 108 low-cost two-story town-
houses, was projected for a parcel of land zoned for multiple family dwellings in an
unincorporated area of St. Louis County, now within the city limits of Black Jack.
Upon hearing of the ICUA's proposal, residents of Black Jack circulated an incorpo-
ration petition that was accepted by the St. Louis County Council. The City of Black
Jack then adopted a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of multiple-family
dwellings. The United States brought suit to enjoin Black Jack from enforcing its
zoning ordinance. Id. at 1182-83. See generally E. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING Ex-
CLUSIONARY ZONING: RECONCILING WORKPLACE AND RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN
AREAS (1974); Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforce-
ment Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 & 1968, 82 HARV. L. REv. 834 (1969).
32. See note 18 supra.
33. "The city asserted primarily the following governmental interests to justify
the ban on further apartment building: (1) Road and traffic control; (2) Prevention of
overcrowding of schools; and (3) Prevention of devaluation of adjacent single-family
homes." United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 1974).
The court found that none of the asserted governmental interests would be furthered
by the challenged zoning ordiance. Id. at 1187.
Black Jack requires the defendant to justify its actions by demonstrating a "com-
pelling interest." Id. at 1185 n.4. It is not clear, however, that the defendant's burden
should be so heavy. The Third Circuit addressed this problem in Resident Advisory
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977). The court noted that "'compelling
interest' analysis is not a part of Title VII doctrine," and concluded that this heavy
burden should be reserved "not for Title VIII defendants, but for those who seek to
justify denials of equal protection by purposeful discrimination." Id. (court's empha-
1978]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In Arlington Heights 1I, the Seventh Circuit recognized that gov-
ernmental action resulting in a racially discriminatory effect may
constitute a violation of the Fair Housing Act.3 4 However, although
finding a racially discriminatory effect in the village's refusal to re-
zone,3 5 the Court refused to shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ant; that is, the court failed to invoke the prima facie case doctrine.
Instead, the court offered a new test designed to ascertain when con-
duct that produces a discriminatory impact is violative of Title VIII.
The court isolated four "critical" factors to be considered:3 6 (1) the
strength37 of the plaintifi's showing of discriminatory effect;3 8 (2) the
presence of discriminatory intent;39 (3) the defendant's interest in
taking the action that produced the discriminatory impact;40 and (4)
sis). The court set out the goal of the defendant's burden: "a justification must serve,
in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant, and
the defendant must show that no alternative course of action could be adopted that
would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact." Id at 149.
See generally Harvard Comment, supra note 4, at 175-83.
34. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 1288.
36. The four factors that the court concentrated on were culled from other Title
VIII cases. In none of those cases are the four factors cited by the Seventh Circuit
explicitly relied upon to determine Title VIII liability. See cases cited at 558 F.2d
1283, 1290-93.
37. By requiring that the village's failure to rezone must totally preclude the pos-
sibility of low-cost housing in Arlington Heights, see note 46 and accompanying text
infra, the court apparently determined that only the strongest of discriminatory effects
will violate Title VIII. Id. at 1291. This rigid approach, however, need not be
adopted. See Harvard Comment, supra note 4, at 165; note 18 supra.
38. The court identified two different kinds of racially discriminatory effects aris-
ing from a racially neutral action: (1) disparate impact; and (2) perpetuation of racial
segregation in the community. 558 F.2d at 1290. See note 18 supra.
39. This is the least important of the four factors. Id. at 1292. Because Title VIII
plaintiffs are unable, in theory, to prove the existence of enough racial motivation to
establish a constitutional violation, the court noted that the presence of partial evi-
dence of intent will strengthen plaintiffs' equitable position. Id.
40. The court identifies three types of defendants and the level of scrutiny appli-
cable to each. First, private individuals, protecting private rights, will not be ac-
corded any deference by the courts and their actions will be carefully scrutinized.
558 F.2d at 1293. Second, a governmental body acting "outside the scope of its au-
thority" will be subject to close scrutiny. Id. Third, courts will give great deference
to actions of governmental bodies "within the ambit of legitimately derived author-
ity." Id. The court, however, does not explain what "outside the scope of authority"
or "within the ambit of legitimately derived authority" mean. Indeed, the two terms
beg the question, since the court would not be able to determine if an act was outside
a government's ambit until the court had closely scrutinized the act. See Note, Ex-




the type of relief, affirmative or prohibitory, sought by plaintiff.41
The court found that two of the factors, numbers 2 and 3, favored
the village's position 42 while one of the factors, number 4, supported
the plaintiff.43 The resolution of this "close case"'  turned on the
strength of the ultimate discriminatory effect45 of the village's refusal
to rezone. The court held that if there was no land other than plain-
tiff's property within the village that was both properly zoned and
suitable for federally subsidized housing, then the refusal to rezone
constituted a violation of Title VIII.
4 6
The four-part Arlington Heights II test marks a major departure
from the prima facie case doctrine. In previous cases, the plaintiffs
showing of discriminatory effect4 7 shifted the burden of proof to the
41. This distinction is based on Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 52 (1972), which
held that there is no constitutional right to decent housing. Id. at 74. Thus, where
plaintiffs attempt to force a governmental defendant to build low-cost housing, courts
are not likely to grant relief. See Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507
F.2d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (no violation of
fourteenth amendment when city abandoned plans for publicly-financed low-cost
housing).
Plaintiffs in Arlington Heights I sought only injunctive relief to restrain defendants
from interfering with plaintiff's project. 555 F.2d at 1293.
42. The court found no evidence of racial intent by the village. 1d. The court
also characterized the refusal to rezone as an act pursuant to a legitimate grant of the
zoning power and consequently warranted great judicial deference. Id. Thus, the
second and third factors were resolved in favor of defendant. By contrast the Eighth
Circuit in Black Jack carefully scrutinized the city's zoning ordinance and its effect
on the racial composition of the adjoining metropolitan area. United States v. City
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185-87 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975). Interestingly, the Arlington Heights II court does not mention this aspect of
Black Jack.
43. Plaintiffs case is strengthened since it merely asks the Court to enjoin the
village from interfering with its attempts to build low-cost integrated housing.
MHDC is not asking for affirmative action by the village. See note 41 supra.
44. This is a "close case" because, using the court's four-part Title VIII test, two
factors favor defendant while one factor favors the plaintiff. 558 F.2d at 1293-94.
45. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
46. 558 F.2d at 1294. Defendant has the burden of proving that a properly
zoned tract of land exists. If a proper tract is not available, the village will have
violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. V 1975) (Title VIII) because its decision not to
rezone will have excluded all low-cost integrated housing from Arlington Heights.
Id. Because the village alleged that a number of properly zoned tracts in Arlington
Heights were available for plaintiff's purposes, the Court remanded the case to deter-
mine if any of the available tracts were both properly zoned and eligible for federal
financing. Id. See United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1970).
47. See note 18 supra.
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defendant.48 However, the Seventh Circuit's test significantly relaxes
the defendant's burden of justification by decreasing the significance
of a plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect. Prior to Arlington
Heights II, a defendant could rebut the plaintiffs Title VIII case only
by justifying its discriminatory actions.49 After Arlington Heights II,
however, a defendant may avoid Title VIII liability even when there
is no justification for its actions. That is, if a plaintiff is unable to
carry the burden on at least two of the four factors identified by the
Seventh Circuit, the defendant will prevail. By advocating a test that
does not shift the burden of proof upon a showing of discriminatory
effect in Title VIII litigation, the Seventh Circuit signalled its willing-
ness, despite language in its opinion to the contrary,50 to disregard
the doctrinal analogy between Title VII and Title VIII.5 '
This refusal to employ the prima facie case doctrine is not justifia-
ble. First, the court purports to employ the same Title VIII analysis
the Eighth Circuit used in Black Jack.52 The Arlington Heights I1
court found, as in Black Jack, that the refusal to rezone produced a
racially discriminatory impact upon the plaintiffs.53 The Arlington
Heights II opinion, however, ignores the Black Jack court's shifting
of the burden of proof to the defendant. Additionally, the Seventh
Circuit's sub silentlo rejection of the prima facie case doctrine and the
attendant heightened burden of proof does not comport with the
broad objectives of the Fair Housing Act.54
By rejecting the prima facie case doctrine in Title VII litigation, the
Seventh Circuit significantly decreases a plaintiffs chances of success
in fair housing litigation. It is likely that more Title VIII claims will
48. See Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 232 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F. 2d 1179, 1185-87 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
49. See note 33 supra.
50. 558 F.3d at 1288-89.
51. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
52. The facts of Arlington Heights II and Black Jack differ in some respects.
Black Jack's action was affirmative, e.g., the city zoned the housing development out.
See notes 31 and 33 supra. Arlington Heights, however, took no affirmative action
but only refused to rezone to allow plaintiff in. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. IM. 1974). This difference
in facts does not justify the Seventh Circuit's approach in Arlington Heights II. Al-
though the Court is not bound by the Eighth Circuit's holding, it is arguable that the
Seventh Circuit should have considered the Title VIII standard used in Black Jack.
53. See note 18 supra.




be pressed upon the courts than in previous years55 because of inher-
ent difficulties in making out a constitutional case of racial discrimi-
nation.56 Lacking any uniform standard of proof 5 for a Title VIII
violation, litigation will undoubtedly be confusing and uncertain.
Supreme Court review of a fair housing case would afford an oppor-
tunity to authoritatively establish an appropriate standard for Title
VIII claims.58
Joel E. Resnick
55. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977).
However, given the increased burden of proof which Washington v. Davis and
Arlington Heights [I] now place upon equal protection claimants, we suspect that
Title VIII will undoubtedly appear as a more attractive route to nondiscrimina-
tory housing, as litigants become increasingly aware that Title VIII rights may be
enforced even without direct evidence of discriminatory intent. We conclude
that, in Title VIII cases, by analogy to Title VII cases, unrebutted proof of dis-
cnminatory effect alone may justify a federal equitable response.
Id.
56. See notes 12 and 25 supra. It is more difficult to prove a subjective state of
mind than an objective fact. The Supreme Court recognized this problem and now
allows intent to be established by indirect, as well as direct, evidence. Some indirect
indicators of racial intent are: (I) historical background of the decision; (2) specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged action; (3) departure from normal
procedures; and (4) legislative history of the challenged act. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977). See also
Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arling-
ton Heights, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1217 (1977).
57. There is an apparent conflict among four circuits that should be resolved.
The Third and Eighth Circuits have held that a showing of discriminatory effect is
sufficient to establish a prima facie Title VIII violation. See Resident Advisory Bd.
v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-50 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d 1179, 1184-87 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); notes 18 and
27-30 supra. The Second Circuit flatly rejected the effect test in Title VIII litigation.
See Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir. 1975); note 18 supra.
The Seventh Circuit, in Arlington Heights II, implicitly rejected the effect test by fail-
ing to apply the prima facie case doctrine.
58. The Supreme Court declined to review the Seventh Circuit's decision. Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 752 (1978).
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